/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT * * Copyright (C) 2017-2021 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved. */ package device import ( "bytes" "encoding/binary" "errors" "net" "sync" "sync/atomic" "time" "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" "golang.org/x/net/ipv4" "golang.org/x/net/ipv6" "golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/conn" ) type QueueHandshakeElement struct { msgType uint32 packet []byte endpoint conn.Endpoint buffer *[MaxMessageSize]byte } type QueueInboundElement struct { sync.Mutex buffer *[MaxMessageSize]byte packet []byte counter uint64 keypair *Keypair endpoint conn.Endpoint } // clearPointers clears elem fields that contain pointers. // This makes the garbage collector's life easier and // avoids accidentally keeping other objects around unnecessarily. // It also reduces the possible collateral damage from use-after-free bugs. func (elem *QueueInboundElement) clearPointers() { elem.buffer = nil elem.packet = nil elem.keypair = nil elem.endpoint = nil } func (device *Device) addToHandshakeQueue(queue chan QueueHandshakeElement, elem QueueHandshakeElement) bool { select { case queue <- elem: return true default: return false } } /* Called when a new authenticated message has been received * * NOTE: Not thread safe, but called by sequential receiver! */ func (peer *Peer) keepKeyFreshReceiving() { if peer.timers.sentLastMinuteHandshake.Get() { return } keypair := peer.keypairs.Current() if keypair != nil && keypair.isInitiator && time.Since(keypair.created) > (RejectAfterTime-KeepaliveTimeout-RekeyTimeout) { peer.timers.sentLastMinuteHandshake.Set(true) peer.SendHandshakeInitiation(false) } } /* Receives incoming datagrams for the device * * Every time the bind is updated a new routine is started for * IPv4 and IPv6 (separately) */ func (device *Device) RoutineReceiveIncoming(IP int, bind conn.Bind) { defer func() { device.log.Verbosef("Routine: receive incoming IPv%d - stopped", IP) device.queue.decryption.wg.Done() device.net.stopping.Done() }() device.log.Verbosef("Routine: receive incoming IPv%d - started", IP) // receive datagrams until conn is closed buffer := device.GetMessageBuffer() var ( err error size int endpoint conn.Endpoint deathSpiral int ) for { switch IP { case ipv4.Version: size, endpoint, err = bind.ReceiveIPv4(buffer[:]) case ipv6.Version: size, endpoint, err = bind.ReceiveIPv6(buffer[:]) default: panic("invalid IP version") } if err != nil { device.PutMessageBuffer(buffer) if errors.Is(err, conn.NetErrClosed) { return } device.log.Errorf("Failed to receive packet: %v", err) if deathSpiral < 10 { deathSpiral++ time.Sleep(time.Second / 3) continue } return } deathSpiral = 0 if size < MinMessageSize { continue } // check size of packet packet := buffer[:size] msgType := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(packet[:4]) var okay bool switch msgType { // check if transport case MessageTransportType: // check size if len(packet) < MessageTransportSize { continue } // lookup key pair receiver := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32( packet[MessageTransportOffsetReceiver:MessageTransportOffsetCounter], ) value := device.indexTable.Lookup(receiver) keypair := value.keypair if keypair == nil { continue } // check keypair expiry if keypair.created.Add(RejectAfterTime).Before(time.Now()) { continue } // create work element peer := value.peer elem := device.GetInboundElement() elem.packet = packet elem.buffer = buffer elem.keypair = keypair elem.endpoint = endpoint elem.counter = 0 elem.Mutex = sync.Mutex{} elem.Lock() // add to decryption queues peer.queue.RLock() if peer.isRunning.Get() { peer.queue.inbound <- elem device.queue.decryption.c <- elem buffer = device.GetMessageBuffer() } else { device.PutInboundElement(elem) } peer.queue.RUnlock() continue // otherwise it is a fixed size & handshake related packet case MessageInitiationType: okay = len(packet) == MessageInitiationSize case MessageResponseType: okay = len(packet) == MessageResponseSize case MessageCookieReplyType: okay = len(packet) == MessageCookieReplySize default: device.log.Verbosef("Received message with unknown type") } if okay { if (device.addToHandshakeQueue( device.queue.handshake, QueueHandshakeElement{ msgType: msgType, buffer: buffer, packet: packet, endpoint: endpoint, }, )) { buffer = device.GetMessageBuffer() } } } } func (device *Device) RoutineDecryption() { var nonce [chacha20poly1305.NonceSize]byte defer func() { device.log.Verbosef("Routine: decryption worker - stopped") device.state.stopping.Done() }() device.log.Verbosef("Routine: decryption worker - started") for elem := range device.queue.decryption.c { // split message into fields counter := elem.packet[MessageTransportOffsetCounter:MessageTransportOffsetContent] content := elem.packet[MessageTransportOffsetContent:] // decrypt and release to consumer var err error elem.counter = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(counter) // copy counter to nonce binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nonce[0x4:0xc], elem.counter) elem.packet, err = elem.keypair.receive.Open( content[:0], nonce[:], content, nil, ) if err != nil { elem.packet = nil } elem.Unlock() } } /* Handles incoming packets related to handshake */ func (device *Device) RoutineHandshake() { var elem QueueHandshakeElement var ok bool defer func() { device.log.Verbosef("Routine: handshake worker - stopped") device.state.stopping.Done() if elem.buffer != nil { device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer) } }() device.log.Verbosef("Routine: handshake worker - started") for { if elem.buffer != nil { device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer) elem.buffer = nil } select { case elem, ok = <-device.queue.handshake: case <-device.signals.stop: return } if !ok { return } // handle cookie fields and ratelimiting switch elem.msgType { case MessageCookieReplyType: // unmarshal packet var reply MessageCookieReply reader := bytes.NewReader(elem.packet) err := binary.Read(reader, binary.LittleEndian, &reply) if err != nil { device.log.Verbosef("Failed to decode cookie reply") return } // lookup peer from index entry := device.indexTable.Lookup(reply.Receiver) if entry.peer == nil { continue } // consume reply if peer := entry.peer; peer.isRunning.Get() { device.log.Verbosef("Receiving cookie response from %s", elem.endpoint.DstToString()) if !peer.cookieGenerator.ConsumeReply(&reply) { device.log.Verbosef("Could not decrypt invalid cookie response") } } continue case MessageInitiationType, MessageResponseType: // check mac fields and maybe ratelimit if !device.cookieChecker.CheckMAC1(elem.packet) { device.log.Verbosef("Received packet with invalid mac1") continue } // endpoints destination address is the source of the datagram if device.IsUnderLoad() { // verify MAC2 field if !device.cookieChecker.CheckMAC2(elem.packet, elem.endpoint.DstToBytes()) { device.SendHandshakeCookie(&elem) continue } // check ratelimiter if !device.rate.limiter.Allow(elem.endpoint.DstIP()) { continue } } default: device.log.Errorf("Invalid packet ended up in the handshake queue") continue } // handle handshake initiation/response content switch elem.msgType { case MessageInitiationType: // unmarshal var msg MessageInitiation reader := bytes.NewReader(elem.packet) err := binary.Read(reader, binary.LittleEndian, &msg) if err != nil { device.log.Errorf("Failed to decode initiation message") continue } // consume initiation peer := device.ConsumeMessageInitiation(&msg) if peer == nil { device.log.Verbosef("Received invalid initiation message from %s", elem.endpoint.DstToString()) continue } // update timers peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal() peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived() // update endpoint peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint) device.log.Verbosef("%v - Received handshake initiation", peer) atomic.AddUint64(&peer.stats.rxBytes, uint64(len(elem.packet))) peer.SendHandshakeResponse() case MessageResponseType: // unmarshal var msg MessageResponse reader := bytes.NewReader(elem.packet) err := binary.Read(reader, binary.LittleEndian, &msg) if err != nil { device.log.Errorf("Failed to decode response message") continue } // consume response peer := device.ConsumeMessageResponse(&msg) if peer == nil { device.log.Verbosef("Received invalid response message from %s", elem.endpoint.DstToString()) continue } // update endpoint peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint) device.log.Verbosef("%v - Received handshake response", peer) atomic.AddUint64(&peer.stats.rxBytes, uint64(len(elem.packet))) // update timers peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal() peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived() // derive keypair err = peer.BeginSymmetricSession() if err != nil { device.log.Errorf("%v - Failed to derive keypair: %v", peer, err) continue } peer.timersSessionDerived() peer.timersHandshakeComplete() peer.SendKeepalive() } } } func (peer *Peer) RoutineSequentialReceiver() { device := peer.device var elem *QueueInboundElement defer func() { device.log.Verbosef("%v - Routine: sequential receiver - stopped", peer) peer.routines.stopping.Done() if elem != nil { device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer) device.PutInboundElement(elem) } }() device.log.Verbosef("%v - Routine: sequential receiver - started", peer) for { if elem != nil { device.PutMessageBuffer(elem.buffer) device.PutInboundElement(elem) elem = nil } var elemOk bool select { case <-peer.routines.stop: return case elem, elemOk = <-peer.queue.inbound: if !elemOk { return } } // wait for decryption elem.Lock() if elem.packet == nil { // decryption failed continue } // check for replay if !elem.keypair.replayFilter.ValidateCounter(elem.counter, RejectAfterMessages) { continue } // update endpoint peer.SetEndpointFromPacket(elem.endpoint) // check if using new keypair if peer.ReceivedWithKeypair(elem.keypair) { peer.timersHandshakeComplete() peer.SendStagedPackets() } peer.keepKeyFreshReceiving() peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketTraversal() peer.timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived() atomic.AddUint64(&peer.stats.rxBytes, uint64(len(elem.packet)+MinMessageSize)) // check for keepalive if len(elem.packet) == 0 { device.log.Verbosef("%v - Receiving keepalive packet", peer) continue } peer.timersDataReceived() // verify source and strip padding switch elem.packet[0] >> 4 { case ipv4.Version: // strip padding if len(elem.packet) < ipv4.HeaderLen { continue } field := elem.packet[IPv4offsetTotalLength : IPv4offsetTotalLength+2] length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field) if int(length) > len(elem.packet) || int(length) < ipv4.HeaderLen { continue } elem.packet = elem.packet[:length] // verify IPv4 source src := elem.packet[IPv4offsetSrc : IPv4offsetSrc+net.IPv4len] if device.allowedips.LookupIPv4(src) != peer { device.log.Verbosef("IPv4 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer) continue } case ipv6.Version: // strip padding if len(elem.packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen { continue } field := elem.packet[IPv6offsetPayloadLength : IPv6offsetPayloadLength+2] length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(field) length += ipv6.HeaderLen if int(length) > len(elem.packet) { continue } elem.packet = elem.packet[:length] // verify IPv6 source src := elem.packet[IPv6offsetSrc : IPv6offsetSrc+net.IPv6len] if device.allowedips.LookupIPv6(src) != peer { device.log.Verbosef("IPv6 packet with disallowed source address from %v", peer) continue } default: device.log.Verbosef("Packet with invalid IP version from %v", peer) continue } // write to tun device offset := MessageTransportOffsetContent _, err := device.tun.device.Write(elem.buffer[:offset+len(elem.packet)], offset) if err != nil && !device.isClosed.Get() { device.log.Errorf("Failed to write packet to TUN device: %v", err) } if len(peer.queue.inbound) == 0 { err := device.tun.device.Flush() if err != nil { peer.device.log.Errorf("Unable to flush packets: %v", err) } } } }